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Abstract: This essay argues that criminality provides a critical magnifying lens to understand 
the network of subversive disconnections and disjunctures in postcolonial cities. By 
connecting the postcolonial city to the discourse on crime, it investigates the specific relations 
between exploitation, colonisation and the underworld. As crossroads of the different 
intersections of power determined by colonialism, decolonisation and globalisation (Varma, 
2011), postcolonial cities expose the many and varied entanglements between the informal 
economies in the Global North and South, between the legal and the unofficial.  Starting with 
the assumption that colonialism is predicated upon the principles of Western modernity, this 
essay frames criminal organisations as forces acting in opposition to and in concurrence with 
the state. Whereas the discourses on criminality are conventionally employed to reinforce 
processes of ‘Othering’ and racialisation in fringe locations, they also have the potential to 
unveil the ‘hidden truths’ of Western urban modernity. To this end, this essay employs Christ 
Stopped at Eboli (1946), a novel that unveils the links between exploitation and illegality. 
The society portrayed in the text shows the manifestations of an ‘unauthorised modernity’; an 
alternative view of development that refashions the meaning of what is conventionally 
regarded as legal and accepted. 
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This essay argues that criminality provides a critical magnifying lens to understand the 
network of subversive disconnections and disjunctures in postcolonial cities. By connecting 
the postcolonial city to the discourse on crime, I want to reflect on the specific relations 
between exploitation, colonisation and the underworld.  Whereas the discourses on 
criminality are employed to reinforce processes of ‘Othering’ and racialisation in fringe 
locations,1  I argue that they have the potential to unveil the ‘hidden truths’ of Western 
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modernity. As John Hagedorn puts it, crime represents a lens to understand ‘the processes of 
globalisation - the redivision of space, the strengthening of traditional identities, and the 
underground economy’.2 
      As crossroads of the different intersections of power determined by colonialism, 
decolonisation and globalisation,3 postcolonial urban spaces are constantly affected by a 
number of variables that defer to the re-enactment of colonialist practices in different 
locations. They expose the many and varied entanglements between the informal economies 
in the Global North and South, between the legal and the unofficial. As with Rita Segato’s 
argument, I posit that the ‘grid of exclusive modernity’ is challenged by certain discourses, 
which highlight the unsustainability of Western dualities. 4  
      If Western modernity retraces what Annibal Quijano calls ‘the basic experience of 
colonial domination’,5 the central question is whether it is possible to establish clear 
demarcations between those forces acting outside and within the state.  Starting with the 
assumption that colonialism is predicated upon the principles of Western modernity, I argue 
that criminality situates itself in the interstices between visible and invisible power. This 
positioning blurs the lines between differential paradigms of modernity: the official and the 
unofficial, legality and illegality, Centre and Periphery.  
       In order to demonstrate how the ambiguous grey areas generated by criminal 
organisations subvert the official taxonomies of power, this essay employs Christ Stopped at 
Eboli (1946) by Carlo Levi;6 a novel which highlights the connections between subalternity 
and alternative paradigms of conventional notions of progression and teleological 
development. The society portrayed in the novel shows what Iain Chambers calls an 
‘unauthorised modernity’,7 an alternative view of development which refashions the meaning 
of what is conventionally regarded as legal and accepted. 
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      Section one explains the connections between criminality and state-power, and explores 
and defines the ambiguous spaces that criminal organisations occupy in the interstices of the 
unofficial economy. Section two focuses on how criminal discourses re-shape the 
reconfigurations of the postcolonial city by unveiling the hidden truths of capitalism. As 
culturally produced, such discourses retrace a link between globalisation and the re-
enactment of colonialist practices. The third section offers a reading of Christ Stopped at 
Eboli that demonstrates how the notion of illegality unveils the link between subjugation, 
represented by the coercive process of Italian unification,8 and the development of subaltern 
geographies of power.   
 
Postcolonialism, Criminality and the State 
John and Jean Comaroff and Comaroff argue that crime is most visible in postcolonies or 
nation-states governed ‘from elsewhere’, where the rule of law has always identified them as 
‘underdeveloped’, and where their modern history began with the onset of neoliberalism.9 
The term ‘neo’ here refers to both the classic eighteenth-century notion of market liberalism 
as the pursuit of common good and  the power to exercise free will among competing 
agents.10 Both definitions conform to American-driven notions of democracy and liberty. 
      These specific orientations have been imposed on postcolonies with disastrous effects on 
their already fragile economies, making them vulnerable to criminal organisations. As 
sources of raw materials, postcolonies have always been exploited. The extractive and 
exploitative nature of colonial projects originates in the grey area between state power and 
economic exploitation. Mancur Olson’s famous metaphor likened the origins of the state to a 
‘stationary bandit’ which  found it more productive to exploit a stable population.11 Predation 
and semi-legalised violence shaped these projects, and, in their aftermath, the mixture of 
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deregulation and atomisation created a fertile terrain for parallel economies and 
‘racketeers’.12 These dynamics are particularly evident in the postcolonies bearing the 
historical traces of overrule of colonialism that, in the past, justified predation and legalised 
violence.13 Criminality is inextricably linked to a long history of colonial exploitation that 
continues today in the aggressive interventions of the neoliberal economy.  
      Comaroff and Comaroff argue that the criminalisation of a number of states in Africa or 
in Latin America as the epitomes of lawlessness and disorder has constituted a frequent 
strategy of economic intervention on behalf of the Western world, especially in the 1990s.14 
Such strategies disguise the deep connivances between legality and criminality in the West; 
the entanglement, as Achille Mbembe puts it, between pariah economies in the Global South 
with countries in the North.15 Colin McFarlane argues these links exist between cities across 
the globe.16 I use the terms Global South and North to discuss the interconnections between 
colonial and neo-colonialist practices, the exploitative entanglements of power linking crime 
to subalternity across the globe.  As Comaroff and Comaroff put it, the Global South 
‘describes a polythetic category, its members sharing one or more…of a diverse set of 
features…the closest thing to a common denominator among them is that many but not all 
were once colonies, protectorates, or overseas ‘possessions’17. However, it is a term that 
‘obscures as much as it describes’, especially in relation to the division between centrality 
and marginality, given the economic entanglements of power that Mbembe mentions.18 As 
Saskia Sassen puts it, cities across the world such as  New York, Tokyo, Paris, London and 
Los Angeles represent ‘a worldwide grid of strategic places’ that cut across national 
boundaries and the old North-South divide.19 Metropoles in the North are closely connected 
to several urban centres in the South such as Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Taipei and 
Mexico City. The intensity of concentration of strategic resources is what creates increasing 
dynamics of inequalities in these cities. These differences generate hierarchies of power 
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within the grid ‘of strategic places’ where capital circulates.  It is in the nodal conjunctures of 
capital circulation that criminality flourishes. 
      The relationship between criminality and the uneven distribution of wealth connects the 
economy to dynamics of subalternity in a similar way to the geographies of dispossession 
generated by colonialism. Antonio Gramsci’s definition of subalternity in relation to class 
illustrates exactly how this comparison works. The exploited sectors of the population are 
identified with subaltern groups outside the conventional institutions of the state, and they are 
geographically, historically and economically displaced.20 Their role is unilaterally defined 
by the place that they occupy in the economic production and their potential to become part 
of the state. Gramsci clarifies that their potential to unify with the state must be taken into 
account on a global scale.21 Gramsci’s contextualisation of the idea of subalternity within the 
North-South divide in Italy at the beginning of the 20th century can be extended to several 
other contexts to open up productive interrogations on the role that criminal organisations 
play within the geographies of marginality previously mentioned. Paradoxically, these areas, 
extending Gramsci’s definition, aspire to become part of the official urban geography.    
      The Global South, as the exemplary space of the geographies of marginality, retraces the 
connection between unofficial work, the mobilisation of capital and the lack of a centralised 
state. These factors have constituted the perfect terrain for the development of transnational 
criminal organisations. Mike Davies argues that the economic policies of non-intervention in 
a  number of cities have generated a polycentric system without boundaries between Centre 
and Periphery .22 Metropoles as varied as such as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Santiago and 
Buenos Aires present  ‘penumbra’ areas created by the unobstructed circulation of 
commodities and the dislocation of manufacturing work.23 These grey zones have assumed 
peculiar connotations in the industrial cities of the South and account for the deep 
entanglements of the official and unofficial economy. My contention is that they can be 
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employed as magnifying lenses to understand what Segato has referred to as the ‘grid of 
exclusive modernity’ revealing the hidden truths of capitalist accumulation.24 
      It is exactly in these ambiguous areas that I want to locate the urban trajectories 
delineated by transnational criminal organisations. Establishing a connection between 
subaltern geographies of power and the darkest recesses of capitalism, the underworld 
retraces the path of the neoliberal economy, while simultaneously providing a lens to 
understand the complex articulations of power that defy the conventional binaries of 
postcolonialism. 
 
Criminality and the City: Mapping the ‘Grey Areas’   
Criminality unveils the complex network of connections and disjunctures that characterise the 
postcolonial city. Neither completely polar to nor synechdochic with the state, the city 
constitutes the privileged terrain of the entanglements of power where criminal organisations 
operate. This section explores the nature of the grey areas within the postcolonial city, and 
ends with a brief examination of the ways in which literary and cultural representations of the 
underworld have the potential to unveil hidden truths.  
      Reversing the simplistic association of crime with the sense of ‘lawlessness’ typical of 
colonial and postcolonial societies, discourses on the underworld are instrumentalised to hide 
the possibility of such re-examination.25 Newspapers’ headlines reiterate the narrative of 
cities in the Global South (primarily in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean) as 
representing a nightmare of suspended law and disorder. Such places have become the 
‘epitome of post/colonial misrule in European eyes, metaphors of malfeasance-kleptocracy, 
neopatrimonialism, clientelism.[They] have long been the accepted forms, popular and 
scholarly alike, for indigenous modes of governance’.26 These countries stand metonymically 
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as vehicles to think about the nightmares that threaten any idea of order in the respectable 
West. As with Edward Said’s argument in Orientalism (1978), criminal discourses have been 
equally appropriated by hegemonic narratives of disorder to denote those ‘barbaric’ locations 
that do not conform to a Western-centric idea of modernity. Comaroff and Comaroff point to 
the cultural and political resonance of the discourse on criminality that unveils several hidden 
truths, and stands metonymically for the fear of the Other: 
 [This narrative ] seeks to plumb the meaning of criminality and the sorts of social 
truths to which it gives rise; to interrogate the larger, more or less visible conditions 
that spawn phenomenologies of fear, the metaphysics of disorder in which they are 
embedded, and the forms of law-enforcement that they mandate; and to situate the 
practical epistemology of crime-and-policing in the changing lineaments of the 
history of the present.27  
Such narratives sit alongside traditional ideas of the Western nation, such as Max Weber’s 
notion that states are defined by holding ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence 
within a given territory’.28 The solid definitions that characterise postcolonial states as 
‘failed’  overlook a whole range of problems that undermine this simplistic notion. Violence 
is one way in which the idea of criminality has been employed to disseminate 
‘phenomenologies of fear’.   As part of the wider discourse on processes of racialisation, 
criminality is often cast as the exemplary condition of the metaphysics of disorder that 
typifies stereotypical representations of the postcolonies. Yet, as with Comaroff’s and 
Comaroff’s contention on the use of the underworld to interrogate ‘social truths’, criminal 
narratives as tools of oppression allow us to understand the dynamics that have generated 
conditions of subalternity. In understanding them, we can reformulate an alternative version 
of history that questions Western-centric modernity.   
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      Laurent Fouchard discusses specifically the official and unofficial entanglements of 
power in a number of African countries where the discourses on criminality are directly 
connected to the feral forces of the neoliberal economy  .29It is urban space that constitutes 
the privileged terrain where ‘multiple authorities compete over state functions’.30 Recent 
studies have shown that a number of African cities have been increasingly managed by self-
regulatory systems working outside state institutions and, as a result, large parts of their 
population are forced to live in ‘quasi-slum’ spaces.31  
      The direct link between economic development and the city allows for an investigation of 
the synergies between the official and the unofficial intersections of power. African cities, as 
emblems of the ‘new assemblages of capital and labour’, demonstrate how neoliberal state 
interventions have created a series of economic disjunctures increasing the number of non-
state actors able to offer direct protection. While such practices have undermined the 
centralised authority of the state, they have empowered what Fouchard terms ‘non-
institutions’ or those informal sectors of the population located on the margins32   
      The same dynamics apply to another city of the Global South: Port Moresby.33 Again 
growth has created a number of grey areas  where ‘the poor and the beggars are condemned 
to an extra-civic fate’.34 John Connell traces a direct connection between a past history of 
colonial exploitation, a weak narrow economic base in the present, and the development of 
criminality in the context of postcolonialism and globalisation. Whilst the state has welcomed 
neoliberal foreign investment, criminality represents an outlet of hope for some parts of the 
population condemned to an ‘extra-civic fate’.35  
       These examples show how discourses on crime, associated superficially with the state of 
lawlessness typical of colonial and postcolonial societies, unveil the ‘forgotten corners of the 
city’,36 itself deeply tied to a wider web of economic interconnections between North and 
South. Whilst traditional representations of criminality are believed to reinforce the status 
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quo by restoring the idea of justice to its order,37 indigenous ‘underworld’ narratives leave 
open a number of productive interrogations by engaging with structures of knowledge that 
are rooted in the specificities of the contexts in which they have been produced. 
      Functioning as disruptive forces on ‘the inner workings of the state’, as Cunneen (2011) 
puts it, criminal narratives reshape ‘the meaning of evidence’ and provide alternative truths38. 
As criminalization is dependent on historical, political amnesia and on processes of ‘othering’ 
and racialization, Cunneen believes there is a strong connection between the discourse on 
crime and nation-building typical of colonial societies.39 He writes that a ‘postcolonial 
perspective’ takes into ‘consideration art and performance in indigenous societies to reinstate 
the voices of the colonized within criminological discourse…Art unhinges colonial law as an 
abstract expression of power and grounds it firmly in the lived experiences’ of the 
oppressed.40 Responding to Cunneen, I argue that indigenous cultural discourses on 
criminality put on the postcolonial map those places that are characterised by a present and 
past history of colonial and neo-colonial subjugation, while creating a differential narrative of 
the city itself.  
      For example, the publication of the non-fictional text Gomorrah by the Neapolitan author 
Roberto Saviano in 2006 sparked a global debate on Naples and its connection to an intricate 
global web of illegal organizations and illicit transactions. Relating an unnamed narrator’s 
experience of the Neapolitan underworld in the early 2000s, Gomorrah presents a telling 
image of the city that, through its criminal organizations, retraces the parallel contours of a 
wider space encompassing, extending and stretching far beyond the state. The text brings into 
the foreground a map of the city that traces a number of connections with a past of indirect 
history of colonial subjugation.41  
      Gomorrah directed the attention towards a rich stream of crime literature and music that, 
until then, had been considered as part of a low-brow culture undeserving of critical attention. 
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Some genres such as the Neapolitan ‘sceneggiata’, a filmic and theatrical representation of 
life in the poor quarters of the city, and partenopop, a stream of music that focuses on the 
social and civic abandonment of the periphery, have put Naples on the broader map of Italy 
as a city neglected by state policies and actions.42 Despite bringing into the spotlight the city 
of Naples and its association with criminality, such cultural discourses generate a number of 
questions on the ambiguous areas mapped by the activities of criminal organisations. Part of a 
wider debate that positions Naples at the forefront of the Italian Southern Question43 and as a 
paradigmatic example of dynamics of subalternity affecting the Global South, in these texts 
the city’s development goes hand in hand with the consolidation of its criminal organisation, 
the Camorra. 
Such a trajectory positions criminality as a phenomenon that has dismantled the 
traditional binaries between Centre and Periphery, central and marginal areas, oppressor and 
oppressed.44 Criminality in Naples becomes the vehicle of a number of transactions and 
movements across the dividing lines of North and South, legality and illegality. When 
conventional urban paradigms collapse, there is a need to reconceptualise the grey areas 
generated by criminal organisations. As outlined above, the connection between subaltern 
geographies of power and the development of criminal organisations demonstrates that the 
underworld acts both in concurrence with and against formally constituted institutions of 
power. As both victims of the lack of state intervention and enablers of the processes that 
constitute Western modernity itself, criminal organisations challenge the dominant narrative 
of space as a site simply contested by the ‘oppressed’ or determined by the hegemonic power 
of the ‘oppressor’.45  
 Indigenous discourses on criminality, rooted in colonialism, neo-colonialism and state 
absence, have the potential to dismantle processes of ‘othering’ and racialisation associated 
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with the postcolonial city. Unveiling these ‘forgotten corners’, they provide a new 
theorisation of the postcolonial city that goes beyond traditional binaries of power.  
 
The Roots of Illegal Modernity in Christ Stopped at Eboli 
As expressions of an ‘ongoing coloniality of power’, the grey areas both encompass and go 
beyond official paradigms of Western-centric modernity. 46 In so doing, they function as 
magnifying lenses, and reveal an ‘unauthorized modernity’ not conforming to the official 
trajectory indicated by colonialist practices. 47 What follows is an investigation of the roots of 
the relationship between subaltern geographies of colonialism and the development of an 
‘illegal modernity’ in Christ Stopped at Eboli; a text that, dealing with oxymoronic concepts 
of development from a Southern perspective, counter-poses and challenges established 
notions of statehood  that lie at heart of the colonial project. 
 Although the topic of reconceptualization of the South as a crossroads of several 
cultural intersections has been previously addressed by several critics,48 the concept of 
‘unauthorised’ or uncanonical modernity has been overlooked. Iain Chambers’ view of the 
Mediterranean as a template to think about modernity from outside conventional hierarchies 
of power offers a useful insight. Focussing specifically on urban space as an example of 
dissonant modernity, Chambers points out how the constitution of the modern European 
nation is constantly re-enacted through the performative interactions of vague colonialist 
practices. Processes of othering that counter-pose the notion of foreignness to Western urban 
space as a symbol of the nation have traditionally been deployed to objectify notions of 
essentialist national belonging. Chambers argues that the modern city reminds us of the 
inhabitations of ‘colonial histories’ and postcolonial proximities.49 The idea of postcolonial 
proximities challenging established notions of Western urbanity becomes the emblem of a 
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migrating modernity that unravels ‘the existing political and historical script’…to include 
other possible narrations of the present and the past.50  These narratives revisit the silences of 
the past while uncovering the effects of postcolonial proximities and dwellings. For example, 
the complex inhabitations and trajectories delineated by criminal organisations reveal both 
the colonialist enactments that are at the base of Western notions of nationhood and of the 
formations of postcolonial proximities constantly threatening established binaries of 
modernity. They represent the ‘Otherness’ that Chambers mentions without implying a 
definite demarcation of hierarchies of power.  
The lack of an established taxonomy of belonging is, I argue, key to understanding the 
challenges and alternatives to established notions of Western urban modernity. These 
intricate articulations require to be understood in a broad framework of analysis that takes 
into account ‘unauthorised’ and ‘illegal’ entanglements of power. Here the term ‘illegal’ 
entails a number of connotations that do not necessarily imply the trespassing of an 
established legal code; rather it encompasses a number of processes of signification that go 
beyond their understanding in relation to formally constituted institutions of power. The 
histories of marginality, which characterise ‘otherness’,  can be seen as illegal or 
unauthorised in that they provide an alternative insight into Western-centric modernity 
allowing ‘the subaltern to interrupt the frame’.51 The discourses on criminality trace a link 
between marginality and location that foregrounds situated historicities as magnifying lenses 
to understand a different process of modernity; they have the potential to  provide an 
ontological re-examination of the possible relationships of power embedded onto city space. 
In so doing, literary and cultural representations of crime foreground an ‘illegal modernity’ 
that authorises the insertion of the hidden truths of capitalism and progress.  
Dealing with notions of marginality, location and ‘unauthorised’ entanglements of 
power, Christ Stopped at Eboli retraces exactly this logic. This text provides a key example 
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of a counter-modernity that challenges the colonialist practices shaping canonical narratives 
of development. Even if it is not set in a major urban centre, the novel offers a significant 
contribution to the idea of criminal discourses reshaping ‘the meaning of evidence’ and 
providing alternative truths. 52 Framed within the larger context of the Italian Southern 
Question, the text’s setting becomes exemplary of the link between exploitation and the 
development of an ‘illegal modernity’; an alternative trajectory of progression that, despite its 
exclusion from the recent entanglements of economic power outlined above, presents an 
interesting case for the argument of criminal discourses acting in concurrence and against the 
state.  As a fictionalised account of the empirical author’s experience of exile in Lucania 
between 1935-1936, the text sketches the portrait of a remote village of Basilicata, Gagliano, 
by defining it, problematically, as ‘primitive’.53 The daily activities of the village are 
measured by the rhythms of the peasants’ rural activities and by the communal sharing of the 
gossip in the local square. As the narrator puts it, Gagliano is ‘cut off from History and the 
State’;54 ‘nobody goes to Church’.55 Questioning the ideological significance of established 
hierarchies of power, the narrator argues that the peasants 
...were not Fascists, just as they would never have been Conservatives or Socialists, or 
anything else. Such matters had nothing to do with them; they belonged to another 
world and they saw no sense in them. What had the peasants to do with Power, 
Government, and the state? The state, whatever form it might take, meant ‘the fellows 
in Rome’. ‘Everyone knows’, they said, ‘the fellows in Rome don’t want us to live 
like human beings’…To the peasants the state is more distant than heaven and far 
more of a scourge’, because it is always against them. Its political tags and platforms 
and, indeed, the whole structure of it do not matter. The peasants do not understand 
them because they are couched in a different language from their own, and there is no 
reason why they should ever care to understand them.56 
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The peasants do not belong to any established political party; they have no faith or interest in 
engaging with the Government and the state. Even the denotations of the term Power are 
obscure to them. As all these terms are equated to the teleological narrative of progress of the 
overall nation, they become empty signifiers. With the implicit assumption that the state and 
the peasants do not share a ‘common language’, Levi is also deferring an explanatory story to 
the dynamics of internal colonisation that have forced the South of Italy in a position of 
subalternity. The condition of abandonment in which Gagliano is coerced to live refers to the 
lack of historical and political integration of these regions into a coherent national project. 
The numerous references to the ‘brigands’, those people who fought against national 
unification, testify to this logic and replace the very rationale of established understanding of 
power and agency.   
Where the carabinieri (local police) do not have any authority, justice is symbolised 
by forces acting outside the state that mimic and re-appropriate its power. As with Eric 
Hobsbawn’s argument, banditry is closely intertwined with the idea of a ‘stateless’ society 
where those who kill are not considered as outlaws but ‘belligerents’, and they only become 
‘punishable’ when they are judged by a legal code that does not belong to them.57 In 
Hobsbawn’s argument, resentment towards the exclusion of the benefits of economic 
modernisation is what underlies banditry. As a result, this sense of abandonment is the 
primary cause for the development of mechanisms of common identification that exclude the 
established institutions of power symbolised by the state. As the narrator puts it: 
The peasants with a few exceptions, were all on the side of the brigands and, with the 
passing of time, the deeds which so struck their fancy became bound up with the 
familiar sites of the village …The brigands unreasonably and hopelessly stood up for 
the life and liberty of the peasants against the encroachments of the state.58    
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Here the brigands represent the peasants’ resentment towards the state that does not care 
about the existence of what the narrator terms the ‘other Italy’.59 Whereas the absence of 
centralised interventions is the primary cause of poverty and the spread of malaria, the 
narrator stresses how the peasants’ lives are not ‘rooted in history’.60 Yet the term ‘history’ 
does not refer to a universal narrative of national development. It is equated to the process of 
digging and retrieving memories that have been arbitrarily buried by a coercive project of 
national unification: 
The ground was littered with calcified bleached bones, flowering out of the graves 
and worn away by wind and sun. To the old man these bones, the dead, animals, and 
spirits were all familiar things, bound up, as indeed they were to everyone in these 
parts, with simple everyday life. ‘The village is built of the bones of the dead.’… The 
old man was quite right, whether he meant these words literally or symbolically, as a 
figure of speech.61   
The bones of the dead keep emerging from underground to remind the visitors of a colonial 
past and present that have debased the lives of the villagers. Gagliano itself is demarcated by 
an extensive ditch called ‘Fossa del Bersagliere’, ‘because in earlier days a captured 
bersagliere62 from Piedmont had been thrown down into the ditch by brigands’.63 The 
topography of the place itself constantly defers to a history of colonial occupation that has 
turned its inhabitants into ‘beasts’.64 Objects that are unfamiliar to visitors and to the narrator, 
who is an outsider because he comes from the North but has been exiled because of his 
opposition to Fascism, are instead considered by the villagers as part of their ‘simple 
everyday life’. Both ‘literally [and] symbolically’, Gagliano’s history needs to be restored, as 
it does not share the same ground of a national modernity following the teleological narrative 
of Western progression. As the narrator puts it succinctly: ‘None of the pioneers of Western 
civilisation brought here his sense of the passage of time, his deification of the State… No 
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one has ever come to this land except as an enemy, a conqueror, or a visitor devoid of 
understanding’.65 Here the lack of Western civilisation and a missing sense of state 
deification find a correlative object in the condition of Gagliano as a forgotten place. While 
the reference to the ‘pioneers of Western civilisation’ refers to a history of colonial 
occupation, it also points to an alternative understanding of the passage of time and to a 
‘justificatory’ morale that considers forces acting outside established hierarchies of power as 
agents of an ‘illegal’ modernity. Hence brigands but not carabinieri tried to restore justice in 
the past. The passage of time is primarily portrayed as an inverse process of retrieval of 
history in which the powers of the state are ignored. Such indicators of a differential narrative 
of development are based on the oxymoronic understanding of modernity itself. 
As demonstrated throughout the text, the concept of modernity is considered 
alongside notions of state, national belonging and geographical positionality in the context of 
colonialist practices. There is an assumption that traditional narratives of Western 
development are inevitably shaped by the social and geographical construct of the state. 
Albert Camus argues that differential narratives of modernity reject tout court the validity of 
the modern state as the emblem of Northern imperialistic power. 66 Camus’ antitheses 
inherent in the concept of rebellion as the seed of life and development can clarify this 
concept. Without ‘organised’ rebellion, society cannot change; yet the organisational 
principles of revolutionary thought have to face the contradictions that politics always calls 
into question: ‘the opposition between violence and non-violence…and the opposition 
between justice and freedom’67 Whereas violence leads to what Camus refers to as absolute 
forms of individualism, without its threat, rebellion would not take place; at the same time, 
justice implies freedom; yet the power of ‘pure freedom’, which according to Camus, extends 
beyond the arbitrary desire to kill people, is extremely dangerous. The question results in a 
dialectical aporia that does not necessarily need to be resolved because it leaves the 
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possibility to generate a number of open-ended discourses. It is these open narratives that 
underlie the very concept of moderation characterising certain Mediterranean or Southern 
locations.  
 In Camus’ terms, the oxymoron characterises a different concept of modernity. 
Hence antithetical discourses need to be incorporated into a different narrative of 
development reconstructed from the South where the normative categories and specificities 
of legality and illegality, state and anti-state, colonial past and postcolonial proximity 
constantly entangle and subvert established epistemologies of thought. ‘Postcolonial 
proximities’ stretch an invisible line that connects the re-enactment of colonialist practices 
with the disjunctures of neo-imperialism and neoliberalism, undermining the very concept of 
Western-centric modernity.68 Despite it being set in the South of Italy during the Fascist era 
when the mobilisations of the neoliberal economy were absent, Christ Stopped at Eboli 
brings into the spotlight the process of internal colonisation that located the Southern regions 
of the country in a position of subalternity. The trope of colonialism appears both indirectly 
through the notion of a fractured state where justice is identified with the justificatory morale 
of brigandism, and indirectly through the expansionist intervention in Abyssinia in 1935-
1936 which feels very remote from the world of the peasants. Opposition to colonialism takes 
the shape of an ‘illegal modernity’ that is equally founded upon a rejection of the state itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 An examination of the cultural representations of the ‘underworld’ demonstrates how 
criminality is strictly connected to those subaltern geographies of power shaped by 
colonialism and the broader re-enactment of colonialist practices perpetuated by Western-
centric modernity. As Cunneen has pointed out, a postcolonial perspective on criminality 
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reshapes ‘the meaning of evidence’ and provides alternative truths69.  It re-instates the 
subaltern’s voice into the ‘exclusive grid of modernity’70.  
      Rather than asserting the exclusivity of criminal discourses within the peripheries, I argue 
that they provide an ontological re-examination of the possibilities that have generated them, 
and an understanding of differential processes of Western modernity.  As with the argument 
presented in the second section of this essay, transnational criminal organisations trace a long 
connecting line between the incursions of neoliberalism and a universal narrative of progress 
that, in Arif Dirlik’s terms, perpetuates the inequalities of colonialism.71 Hence, there is a 
connection between the development of criminal organisations in places that have been 
subjected to direct, indirect colonial subjugation  and to the more encompassing forces of an 
‘ongoing coloniality of power’.72 It is primarily in the situated historicities of public space 
that criminal organisations unveil a number of grey areas simultaneously supporting and 
rejecting conventional dichotomies between state and anti-state, legal and illegal.  
These areas offer a very different vision of modernity, as Christ Stopped at Eboli 
shows, rooted in a place outside of the state in an ‘extra civic fate’. The text has demonstrated 
the existence of what I have called an ‘illegal’ modernity characterised by the existence of 
non-institutions standing at a distance from time and history. It has provided an example of 
how history, the state and religion as the classic parameters of modernity, do not constitute 
the sole lenses of progress. On the contrary, they become empty signifiers pointing to the 
existence of subversive and unauthorised dynamics of power.  These interconnections 
between legality and illegality State and anti-state undermine the very foundations of the 
‘coloniality of power’.73 While unveiling the connections between colonialism, neoliberalism 
and the re-enactment of colonialist practices, the discourses on criminality also provide a 
different map of modernity conceptualised from the South. As the real and imaginary 
crossroads of colonialism, postcolonialism and globalisation, the postcolonial city becomes 
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the key arena for important processes of cultural signification nuancing and extending the 
spatial dyads of power between Centre and Periphery, the oppressor and the oppressed.    
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